/usr/src/kernels/4.18.0-553.121.1.el8_10.x86_64/security
NameSizeModeActions
apparmor/-0755rm
bpf/-0755rm
integrity/-0755rm
keys/-0755rm
loadpin/-0755rm
selinux/-0755rm
smack/-0755rm
tomoyo/-0755rm
yama/-0755rm
Kconfig118940644editdlrm
Kconfig.hardening15510644editdlrm
Makefile8340644editdlrm
Edit: /usr/src/kernels/4.18.0-553.121.1.el8_10.x86_64/security/Kconfig.hardening (1551B)
menu "Kernel hardening options" config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default" help This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0". When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic workloads have measured as high as 7%. config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default" help This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0". Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled, all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced, as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents. The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%. endmenu